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Abstract 
 
This article is a study of the continuities and changes in the state-led institutionalisation of religion in the 
PRC from 1979 to 2009 and their effects on the structuring of China’s religious field. A normative 
discourse on religion is constituted by a network of Party leaders, officials, academics, and religious leaders. 
Official religious institutions have become hybrids of religious culture with the institutional habitus of 
work units (danwei) in the socialist market economy. A wide range of religious practices have found 
legitimacy under secular labels such as health, science, culture, tourism, or heritage. Religious affairs 
authorities have begun to acknowledge the existence of this expanding realm of religious life, and to accord 
discursive legitimacy to the previously stigmatised or ignored categories of popular religion and new 
religions, but hesitate to propose an explicit change in policy.  
 
Over the past 30 years, China has witnessed the flourishing and transformation of 
multiple forms of religiosity, covering a vast range of practices including family rites of 
passage, temple festivals, modern spiritual networks, ethnic religions, and transnational 
communities.1 Most of these developments have occurred from the bottom up, outside 
the institutional sphere assigned to “religion” by the state, and often escaping its direct 
control. Much of the literature on the state’s religious policy during these years has built 
on a paradigm of church-state relations in which the focus has been on monitoring the 
                                                
1 The primary sources used for this article are the documents referenced in the text as well as interviews 
and conversations held between 2005 and 2009 with officials of the United Front and Religious Affairs 
Bureaus at the national level as well as of Shanghai, Shaanxi, and Gansu; several Chinese scholars active in 
the discourse on religion; officials of the Cultural Affairs Bureau of Yingde County, Guangdong; office 
holders of the Huashan Daoist Association, Huayin, Shaanxi; as well as members of most of the religious 
communities mentioned in the article. I would like to thank the Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient and the 
French Centre for Research on Contemporary China for its support in making the field research and 
collection of documentary materials possible. I am also grateful to Vincent Goossaert and Sébastien 
Billioud for their editorial suggestions.  
repression and control of religion by the state, identifying the limits to religious freedom 
in China, and noting that, since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, if the overall 
trend has been one of a gradual loosening of restrictions on religious life, the state has 
continued to assert its ultimate authority over the religious sphere.2  
While such an observation is broadly valid, the evolution of China’s religious policy 
cannot be described as a simple process of the state stepping out (or back in) to give 
more or less freedom to religious groups and communities. On the contrary, the state has 
continued to play a key role in constituting and structuring the religious field, alongside 
religious groups and leaders themselves. To describe this dynamic, however, we need to 
avoid uncritically applying a paradigm of church-state relations derived from the Western 
experience, which assumes the prior mutual autonomy of church and state, describes the 
tensions and power relations between the two, and posits that the normal and desirable 
state of affairs, in a condition of secularised modernity, is one in which, while the state is 
neutral and free from the political influence of religious institutions, it does not interfere 
in the affairs of religious institutions and communities.  
This paradigm is a result of the historical trajectory of Europe, in which the nation-
state broke out of the shadow of the Church of Rome – a trajectory fundamentally 
different from the Chinese experience. After the proscription of Buddhism in 842 left 
the Buddhist sangha permanently weakened, for one thousand years until the nineteenth 
century no trans-local religious institution ever managed to secure its independence from 
the imperial state, which positioned itself as the supreme religious authority in a society 
steeped in religiosity without a clear distinction between the religious and the secular. For 
a century from the Opium War (1843) until Liberation (1949), the Christian churches 
asserted their independence from the Chinese state, but since this was a religion 
introduced from abroad, whose independence was forced on China by the guns of the 
Western powers, the churches could not readily stand as examples of a religious 
institution fully autonomous from the political sphere. Christianity did have a profound 
impact on the entire religious field during this period, becoming a normative model for 
all other religious traditions and of the very notion of religion as a distinct and 
                                                
2 See for example Beatrice Leung, “Religious Freedom and the Constitution in the Peoples’ Republic of 
China: Interpretation and Implementation,” Diskus, vol. 3, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1-18; Tony Lambert, “The 
Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party,” Religion, State & Society, vol. 29, no. 2, 2001, pp. 
121-129; Pitman Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” China Quarterly, no. 174, 2003, 
pp. 317-337; Jason Kindopp et. al. (eds.), God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, 
Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2004; Beatrice Leung, “China’s Religious Policy: The Art of 
Managing Religious Activity,” China Quarterly, no. 184, 2005, pp. 894-913.  
autonomous category.3 When it found its place in the Marxist ideology of the Chinese 
Communist Party, however, the state-religion distinction came to designate not two 
autonomous spheres, but an opposition between two types of political forces, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat on the one hand and the instruments of feudalism and 
imperialism on the other.  
 
The state-led institutionalisation of religion in the PRC 
 
When the CCP took power in 1949, it thus considered the religious question solely from 
the angle of political struggle, both in terms of long-term vision and short-term 
pragmatic considerations. The purpose of religious policy was to eviscerate religious 
communities of their connections with political enemies and turn them into instruments 
of the Communist Party’s United Front, all the while making efforts to avoid alienating 
religious believers, and, while respecting their freedom of belief, leave them to naturally 
wither away as the class basis of religion disappeared. No space was given to those forms 
of religiosity that had no potential symbolic and institutional autonomy from the feudal 
and semi-colonial structures of the old society: Confucianism, disorganised since the 
collapse of the imperial examination system and mandarinate, was completely banned as 
the very essence of “feudalism”;4 the thousands of redemptive societies,5 which aimed to 
reformulate and revive traditional religion, were ruthlessly persecuted as “reactionary 
sects and secret societies”; the millions of communal cults, deeply rooted in traditional 
rural society, were stigmatised as “feudal superstition”;6 and only Christianity, Islam, and 
Buddhism (and, as an afterthought, monastic Daoism), with their international 
recognition as world religions, their self-contained scriptural and symbolic systems, and 
their easily identifiable clerical institutions, were accorded legitimacy as “religion,” and 
organised into state-sponsored national patriotic associations under the supervision of 
                                                
3 See Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, forthcoming, chap. 3.  
4 Anna Xiao Dong Sun, “The Fate of Confucianism as a Religion in Socialist China: Controversies and 
Paradoxes,” in Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney (eds.), State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies, 
Leiden, Brill, 2005, pp. 229-254. 
5 The “redemptive societies” were a wave of salvational movements that appeared in the first decades of 
the twentieth century, which typically combined the union of the Three Teachings (Confucianism, Daoism, 
and Buddhism, to which Christianity and Islam were often added) with spirit-writing, philanthropy, and a 
milleniarian eschatology, and often adopted modern forms of organisation and teaching. See Prasenjit 
Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity. Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003, pp. 103-104; David A. Palmer, “Redemptive Societies: Historical Phenomenon or Sociological 
Category?,” forthcoming in Minsu ch’ü-yi.  
6 Vincent Goossaert, “Le destin de la religion chinoise au 20e siècle,” Social Compass, vol. 50, no. 4, 2003, pp. 
429-40.  
the State Council’s Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), while cooperative religious leaders as 
individuals were dealt with by the United Front Department of the CCP.  
This article focuses on the state-led institutionalisation of religion from the post-Mao 
era until today, and its effect on the structuring of China’s religious field. This 
institutionalisation has been limited to those recognised religions, and has excluded not 
only the other forms of religiosity mentioned above – which did and still do represent a 
far greater portion of China’s religious field – but also newer forms of indigenous and 
global forms of religiosity that have appeared in China since the 1980s. For lack of space, 
this article focuses on the religious institutions of the Han majority, and among them, 
more attention will be paid to Buddhism and Daoism – for which the impact of 
institutionalisation has been the most profound, since there is no historical experience of 
national religious institutions, creating an unprecedented level of national integration of 
these two religions’ clerical networks and liturgies.7 This is not a study of the grassroots 
religious life of these communities, but of the institutional processes that aim to structure 
the grassroots – and whose actors typically complain about how difficult it is to organise 
the people, with their low levels of education and sushi.8 My discussion focuses on what 
Vermander calls the state’s “functionalisation” of religion -- how it creates what 
Fenggang Yang has called the “red market” of religion in China, in which “the red stain 
[of communist ideology] is reflected in the rhetoric of clergy, theological discourse, and 
practices of the sanctioned religious groups.”9 As with secular state-building in China, the 
degree of institutionalisation is stronger at the national level and is significantly weaker in 
more remote localities.10 The process does, nonetheless, profoundly shape the religious 
                                                
7 See Vermander’s and Goossaert and Fang’s contributions to this issue. The cases of ethnic minority 
religions, such as Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic faith of the Hui and Uyghurs, as well as those of 
Catholic and Protestant Christianity, have played a fundamental role in the Chinese state’s formulation of 
religious policy. But they have dominated the academic literature on Chinese religious policy, as well as 
international media attention, while China’s religious mainstream has been relatively ignored. Since these 
religions are associated with either strong non-Han ethnic identities or with strong foreign-based religious 
institutions, they tend to generate more clearly differentiated relations between state and religion. On Tibet, 
see Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1997, and Melvyn C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein (eds.), Buddhism in 
Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. On 
Islam in China, see Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the Peoples’ Republic, Cambridge, 
MA, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1996. On Protestantism, see Daniel H. Bays, 
“Chinese Protestant Christianity Today,” The China Quarterly, no. 174, 2003, pp. 488-504; Alan Hunter and 
Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; on 
Catholicism, see Richard Madsen, China’s Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1998.  
8 See Kang Xiaofei’s and Cao Nanlai’s contributions to this issue.  
9 Fenggang Yang, “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China,” The Sociological Quarterly, no. 97, 
2006, p. 97.  
10 For a bottom-up approach to this question, see David A. Palmer, “Religiosity and Social Movements in 
China: Divisions and Multiplications,” in Gilles Guiheux & K. E. Kuah-Pearce (eds.), Social Movements in 
field. Institutionalisation is understood here as formulated by Ji Zhe, taking inspiration 
from Giddens:  
 
An “institution” could be conceived of as the general manner of the reproduction of rules and 
resources. If an organization is reconfigured by the encompassing external institutional 
arrangement, so that its structure and its rules about the reproduction and distribution of 
resources tend to be identical with its institutional environment, then it can be seen as an 
‘institutionalized’ organization.11  
 
On the one hand, the rejection of revolutionary iconoclasm and radicalism, and the 
policy of reform and opening up, has led to a greater tolerance toward religion; and an 
increasingly prominent discourse on the positive contributions of religion to 
philanthropy and social morality has even led to an exploration of ways of positively 
encouraging the development of religion. On the other hand, the Leninist model of state 
control of religious institutions has been retained and even reinforced as the state has 
expanded and modernised its bureaucracy. This tendency has been spurred by fears of 
political challenges and separatism emanating from an exploding popular religiosity – as 
in the case of Falun Gong12 – and foreign links to religious communities, as in the case of 
Tibetans and Uyghurs. The tension between these two tendencies could only be resolved 
through strengthening religious orthodoxy, at the level of both discourse and institutions, 
so that religion could play its assigned role as an adjunct to social development, while 
also warding off political and separatist threats. The post-Mao religious 
institutionalisation, however, has not been a purely top-down enterprise as it had been in 
the 1950s; it is a project in which religious leaders, government officials, and scholars 
have invested themselves, combining different discursive regimes and forming a hybrid 
religio-bureaucratic institution. At the same time, the narrowness of the legitimate 
category of religion has reinforced the de-institutionalisation of other forms of religiosity, 
which have been forced to exist as dispersed networks or as underground organisations, 
and/or to seek institutionalisation under other categories such as health, tourism, or 
                                                                                                                                      
China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest Space, Amsterdam, ICAS/Amsterdam University Press, pp. 
257-282.  
11 Ji Zhe, “Secularization as Religious Restructuring: Statist Institutionalization of Chinese Buddhism and 
its Paradoxes,” in Mayfair Yang (ed.), Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2008, pp. 239-240; referring to Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social 
Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, London, Macmillan, 1979; The Constitution of Society, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984.   
12 See David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.  
heritage, leading them to become partly or fully assimilated into the secular logics of 
those categories. In the past few years, state religious authorities have recognised the 
existence of such phenomena and become more open to a potential broadening of the 
category of religion. But the logic of state-led religious institutionalisation implies that 
such a broadening does not lead to a “freeing up” of the religious sphere along the 
Western model of church-state separation, but rather to the difficulty of expanding 
institutional management over an ever-growing religious domain. 
The patriotic religious associations created under the CCP’s guidance in the 1950s 
were, for all five religions concerned, entirely new institutional formations. Never in 
history had China’s Buddhists, Daoists, or Muslims been united in a China-wide 
organisation (there had been many attempts in the Republican period [1911-1949], but 
most of these had failed).13 The multifarious Protestant sects and denominations were 
forced to merge into a single unit, cut off from overseas churches and missionary 
societies. And the Catholic association took orders from Zhongnanhai instead of the 
Vatican. Even within these five religions, the boundaries of legitimate religiosity were 
clearly drawn, excluding “feudal superstition” (especially in the cases of Buddhism and 
Daoism), links with “imperialist powers” (especially in the cases of Protestantism and 
Catholicism), and all groups that refused to submit to the authority of the patriotic 
associations (again especially in the cases of the Christian churches, as well as a portion 
of the Tibetan Buddhist clergy).14 
  The Cultural Revolution had seen all the socialist religious institutions abolished, 
from the United Front Department to the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Associations, 
as religion became a direct target to be eliminated. In the period of “reform and opening 
up” from 1979 onwards, this system was re-instated, but in a radically different context. 
Even when the state stepped back to leave more space for religious activity, there were 
no strong indigenous religious institutions to occupy that space – in sharp contrast to the 
Orthodox and Catholic churches that quickly reinvested the religious field in post-
socialist Eastern Europe and Russia. In the absence of a single, dominant religious 
institution, the Chinese state continued, by will and by default, to play the central role of 
                                                
13 On Buddhism, see Holmes Welch, Buddhism under Mao, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972. On 
the Republican-era religious associations, see Vincent Goossaert, “Republican Church Engineering: The 
National Religious Associations in 1912 China,” in Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (ed.), Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions 
of Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008, pp. 209-232. 
 
14 For an analysis of CCP policy toward religion from 1921 to 1966, see Vincent Goossaert and David A. 
Palmer, op. cit., chap. 6; for a collection of primary texts from 1949 to 1970, see Donald E. MacInnis, 
Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.  
defining and protecting religious orthodoxy. Historically, China’s religious institutions 
had already been weak before 1949; the PRC regime had created new institutions in the 
1950s, but they had been primarily political creations, and were gutted by the Cultural 
Revolution. But it was these associations that were called on to organise China’s 
resurgent religiosity, and that needed to be strengthened and further institutionalised. 
The state attempted to shift from ideological dogmatism to the political co-optation of 
religious leaders, the bureaucratic management of religious communities, and the 
harnessing of religious resources to the goals of economic development and social 
harmony.  
The state-led institutionalisation of Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and 
Protestantism has created a relatively homogenous institutional structure for these five 
traditions, a hybrid of the secular socialist work unit (danwei) and traditional forms of 
clerical organisation, which has become constitutive of the religious habitus of the leaders 
of these communities.15 The danwei is the modular system of nested units under which, in 
socialist China, all units of production and administration were nationalised and 
organised, and to which all workers were assigned for life, providing not only work but 
also residential, leisure and welfare facilities. While officially registered religious 
communities, as associations, are not fully-fledged danwei, they partake of the same 
institutional logic: bureaucratic positions (such as huizhang, “chairman,” bangongshi zhuren, 
“general manager,” etc.) take precedence over, or even fully replace ecclesiastic rank; the 
key hierarchical relationships are those between the Association Chairman (who is 
usually also the abbot or leading cleric of the main temple or church within a given 
jurisdiction) and the representatives of the CCP United Front branch and the Religious 
Affairs Bureau. These relationships play themselves out in the appointment of personnel 
to other positions and in the internal politics of resource allocation. Rewards for 
performance, in the form of increased resources and appointment to higher 
administrative rank or to prestigious political positions (Peoples’ Consultative 
Conferences), give as much weighing to political as to religious abilities. All of these 
performances, positions, and resources are negotiated through the guanxi culture of 
relationship management, which pervades the religious institutions as much as any 
secular institution.  
As most danwei have, since the 1990s, been encouraged and even required to become 
self-subsisting in the market economy, so have the religious communities, which have 
                                                
15 See Billioud and Thoraval’s contribution to this issue for a discussion of the juxtaposition of the post-
Mao socialist habitus and traditional Confucian ritual sacrality.  
been pressured to post positive economic performance by selling profit-making services 
and commodities.16 However, while the danwei system was largely dismantled in the late 
1990s, reducing if not eliminating most enterprises’ requirement of political performance 
and leaving them free to live or die in the market, religious associations are among the 
categories of units along with schools, government administrations, the army, and 
strategic industries that remain under close political supervision. Religious danwei today 
are thus hybrids of religious culture with the institutional habitus of work units in the 
socialist market economy. This hybridisation is not an easy process, and can be painful to 
religious practitioners seeking spiritual purity. Nor are the relations between the different 
components of the institutional structure always harmonious; indeed, conflicts are 
frequent, sometimes even violent, between clerics, official associations, and the religious 
affairs authorities, or between religious institutions and non-religious units such as 
tourism authorities fighting over the use of scenic sites and their revenues.17 But these 
conflicts, and the norms of playing them out and solving them, are themselves 
constitutive of the institutional order. In order to understand this process of 
institutionalisation, we need to consider the discursive networks in which the boundaries 
and forms of religion as a distinctive institution are defined, and the regulations that aim 
to translate the discourse into reality, and then consider the specific structure of the 
official bodies that create and reproduce these institutional forms. While I discuss 
discourses and institutions separately for ease of presentation, we should bear in mind 
that the two are in fact mutually constitutive.  
   
The discursive network on religion 
 
Each political system has its own regime of producing a discourse on legitimate forms of 
religion. This discourse not only assigns ideas, practices, and groups into a category of 
religion, with distinct rights, restrictions, and positions within the range of functionally 
differentiated social institutions in a given society, but also contributes to shaping the 
internal structure and norms of the religious groups themselves. Discourses on religion 
                                                
16 See Yang Der-ruey, “The Changing Economy of Temple Daoism in Shanghai,” in Fenggang Yang and 
Joseph B. Tamney (eds.), State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies, Leiden, Brill, 2005, pp. 113-148; 
Graeme Lang, Selina Chan, and Lars Ragvald, “Temples and the Religious Economy,” ibid. pp. 149-180.  
17 See, for example, the case of Nanputuo described in David Wank, “Institutionalizing Modern ‘Religion’ 
in China's Buddhism: Political Phases of a Local Revival,” in Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank (eds.), 
Making Religion, Making the State: the Politics of Religion in Modern China, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
2009, pp. 126-150.  
in the Peoples’ Republic of China should be seen in the context of the broader economy 
of discourse production and circulation between various official and unofficial actors, 
including Party leaders and organs, government departments, academic institutions, 
religious leaders and followers, and the media. We also need to bear in mind how, within 
this economy, a whole set of categories has evolved, often in opposition to each other, 
each of which has been used to label phenomena related to what, in anthropological 
terms, may broadly be considered as pertaining to the religious domain. These categories 
include “religion” zongjiao, of course, but also mixin (superstition), fandong huidaomen 
(reactionary secret society), and xiejiao (evil cult); minjian xinyang (popular faith) as well as 
wenhua (culture) and wenwu (cultural relic), fei wuzhi wenhua yichan (intangible cultural 
heritage), minsu (folk customs), minzu fengqing (exotic ethnic customs), and anything that 
can be categorised as a “tourist resource”; as well as “nourishing life,” “qigong,” “martial 
arts,” “Chinese medicine,” “sports,” and “science”; and even “philanthropy,” “National 
studies,” and “international exchange.” Each of these categories is part of a distinct 
discursive network, entailing a different type of dynamic relationship with the state and 
its definitions of orthodoxy, and producing a different logic of organisation and action, 
within the common structure of what Billioud and Thoraval, in their contribution to this 
issue, call the “post-Mao habitus.”   
In the case of “religion,” the discursive network is composed of Party leaders giving 
speeches on religion; the United Front Department and the Religious Affairs Bureaus at 
the national, provincial, and local levels; several types of academic institution—notably 
the Institute for World Religions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 
departments of philosophy and religious studies at the main universities, some of which 
dominate academic discourse on a certain religion (such as Sichuan University’s Institute 
for Daoism and Religious Culture); 18 and the leaders of the five religious associations, 
and of the official training institutes and seminaries of those religions. These different 
types of persons (officials, academics, religious leaders) have different perspectives but 
share a globally reformist outlook that generally encourages a secularised, ethical vision 
of religion; academics, no less than the religious leaders, have been active in formulating 
their vision of how the religion they study should modernise.  
Members of the discursive network on religion, as officials, scholars, or state-
recognised religious leaders, are expected to speak within the framework of broader Party 
                                                
18 Fenggang Yang, “Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality,” in Yang and Tamney (eds), op. 
cit., pp. 19-40.  
policy. As such, their pronouncements carry a certain degree of authority and contribute 
to official discourse on religion. On the other hand, each has his own interests, 
allegiances, and integration into other discursive networks, so that there is a clear 
difference in the perspectives of the discursive actors. As Ryan Dunch has aptly 
formulated, a given policy pronouncement “functions as both code and cover: code for a 
set of officially sanctioned expectations, and cover for a broad range of intellectual and 
theological agendas invoking it as legitimation.”19 Party policy thus creates a common 
discursive framework that is invested and reproduced by actors with different interests 
and loyalties. The primary allegiance of religious affairs officials is to the government—
but within the government they often see themselves (or are seen) as defenders of 
religious interests, or as promoters of a “proper” form of religion. Religious leaders toe 
the Party line in order to protect the interests of their communities, and also to reinforce 
their authority within the community. Scholars typically have a more liberal attitude than 
the government, but also need to establish and protect the legitimacy of their field of 
study, and they use academic norms of distance and objectivity to balance their 
sympathies with the religions they study. The best known case is the “cultural 
Christians,” academics and intellectuals who do not explicitly profess belief in 
Christianity but take a Christian standpoint to engage in a critique of China’s moral and 
social problems.20 Another example is a network of scholars claiming the label of “New 
Daoism” xin daojia, who argue that Daoism should develop a new ideology for the 
twenty-first century based on environmentalism, gender equality, and traditional culture.21 
We may also cite the widespread influence among academics and intellectuals of 
reformist Buddhism through the writings and initiatives of clerics such as Hsing Yun or 
Jinghui.22 It is in this context of multiple allegiances and complex motives that discourse 
on religion is generated through various publications and journals, and through meetings 
and conferences that might include one or several categories of discursive actor. 
 
The evolving discourse of Party leaders 
 
                                                
19 Ryan Dunch, “Christianity and ‘Adaptation to Socialism’,” in Mayfair Yang (ed.), op. cit., p. 172.  
20 Dunch, ibid.  
21 Hu Fuchen, “21 shiji de xin daoxue wenhua zhanlue” (Strategy for the New Daoist Culture of the 
twenty-first century), in Hu Fuchen and Lü Xichen, Daoxue tonglun (Daoist Studies), Beijing, Shehui kexue 
wenxian chubanshe, 2004, pp. 716-744.  
22 Fenggang Yang and Dedong Wei, “The Bailin Buddhist Temple: Thriving under Communism,” in Yang 
and Tamney (eds.), op. cit., pp. 63-86; Zhe Ji, “Religion, Youth and Modernity: Summer Camp as a New 
Ritual Practice of Chinese Buddhism,” in Social Compass, forthcoming.  
Speeches of CCP leaders, and a few related official documents, provide the overarching 
framework for the discursive network on religion. These documents and speeches, of 
course, take into account the other voices within the discursive network, and also react to 
the general evolution of the domestic and international political context. They provide 
the guidelines for drafting national regulations on religion, which are few in number; the 
bulk of the administrative texts that apply to religious institutions are actually enacted at 
the provincial or local level, with much more detail on procedures, and also with a high 
decree of discrepancy between different places—reflecting the even higher degree of 
discrepancy in the actual practices of local officials, who are quite open to reform and 
experimentation in some places and bent on tight control in others. Details of the rituals 
and practices (divination, healing rites…) that are allowed or banned vary greatly from 
province to province.23 
Every few years, speeches by the CCP’s top leaders set the tone for the discourse on 
religion. Each time, there have been subtle adjustments in the discourse, in which the 
Marxist doctrine of the “disappearance of religion” is deferred to an ever more distant 
future, while the positive contributions of religion to society are given an ever-greater 
recognition. At the same time, the fundamental premise—of the CCP’s ultimate 
authority over religion, and its duty to control and guide its development—has remained 
unchanged.  
An important discursive change occurred when, in the early 1980s, scholars were 
permitted to debate and re-interpret Marx’s comments on “religion as the opium of the 
                                                
23 Xing Fuzeng, “Church-State Relations in Contemporary China and the Development of Protestant 
Christianity,” China Study Journal, vol. 18, no. 3, 2003, p. 27 n. 42; Ying Fuk-Tsang, “New Wine in Old 
Wineskins: An Appraisal of Religious Legislation in China and the Regulations on Religious Affairs of 
2005,” Religion, State & Society, vol. 34, no. 4, 2006, pp. 354-355. See Donald E. MacInnis, Religion in China 
Today: Policy and Practice, Maryknoll, Orbis, 1989, for a comprehensive compilation of translated official 
policy documents, speeches and news reports from the 1980s. A complete collection of authoritative policy 
documents and speeches from 1979 to 1995 is published in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 
zonghe yanjiuzu, Guowuyuan zongjiao shiwuju zhengce faguisi (ed.), Xin shiqi zongjiao gongzuo wenxian 
xuanbian (Compilation of documents on religious work for the new era), Beijing, Zongjiao wenhua 
chubanshe, 1995. For the full text of several national, provincial, and local documents, see Xingzhengyuan 
dalu weiyuanhui, Dalu diqu zongjiao fagui huibian (Compilation of religious regulations of the Mainland 
region), Taipei, Xingzhengyuan dalu weiyuanhui, 1995; also Guojia zongjiao shiwuju zhengce faguisi, 
Quanguo zongjiao xingzheng fagui guizhang huibian (National compilation of laws and regulations on the 
administration of religion), Beijing, Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2000. Some of these documents are 
translated in Human Rights Watch Asia, China: State Control of Religion 1997, 
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masses,” claiming that this statement applied to the role of religion in nineteenth-century 
Germany and not to the essence of religion itself.24 This opened the way for religion to 
be depicted as having positive as well as negative factors. The new thinking was reflected 
in a document issued by the CCP Central Committee on 31 March 1982 entitled “The 
basic viewpoint and policy on the religious question during our country’s socialist 
period,”25 often referred to as “Document 19,” and which was both a revision of the 
Party’s basic viewpoint on religion and an outline of specific policies and regulations. 
The document stated that in socialist China, now that class exploitation had been 
successfully eradicated, “the class root of the existence of religion was virtually lost.” But 
since peoples’ consciousness lags behind changes in social structure, old ways of thinking 
will continue to persist, people will still need religion at times of disaster and misfortune, 
and religion will not disappear until the long stage of socialism is completed and 
communism is realised.26  
Document 19 provided the ideological justification for the restoration of religious life 
following the Cultural Revolution, and for the protection of freedom of individual 
religious belief enshrined in the revised Constitution of 1982.27 The official religious 
associations were reinstated, officially designated places of religious worship were re-
opened, and religious communities were allowed and even encouraged to engage in 
international exchanges with their coreligionists. But the policy drew a clear line between 
“normal” religious life, which was permitted, and other illegal activities. The 1982-1984 
crackdown on “spiritual pollution” targeted those activities: reactionary secret societies 
(huidaomen) and “spirit-mediums and witches” (shenhan wupo) were to be prevented from 
returning to activity, while practitioners of superstitious professions such as divination, 
physiognomy, numerology, and fengshui were to be re-educated to find another profession 
to make a living; if they persisted, they were to be disbanded. The building of lineage 
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halls and ancestral shrines was also banned, and those already built were to be 
expropriated.28  
Notwithstanding these campaigns, religious activities rapidly multiplied in the more 
open atmosphere of the 1980s. The growing contacts with foreign religious networks 
began to worry CCP leaders. This concern became especially salient following the 
collapse of the USSR and during the Tiananmen student movement of 1989, and led to a 
crackdown on underground Catholic and Protestant leaders in 1990-1991. 29  At a 
“National Religious Work Conference” held in December 1990, Jiang Zemin stressed the 
importance of religious work in order to ensure ethnic harmony and protect China’s 
territorial integrity, and to struggle against infiltration by foreign religious forces as well 
as against those, including Christians, who, through developing churches, were suspected 
of attempting, from the bottom-up, to put pressure on the CCP to lead China on the 
road to democracy.30 These points were laid out in a new policy document, “Document 
6,” issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on 5 February 1991,31 
which called for a reinforcement of the institutional management of religion, and 
prompted provincial and municipal authorities in several jurisdictions to issue detailed 
regulations.  
The main culprits of religious infiltration and political interference were, in the 1980s, 
seen to be the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant missionary societies. 32  The 
possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican carried the risk of the 
Holy See attempting to control Chinese Catholics.33 Protestant missionising was also seen 
as a threat through its multi-pronged strategies of evangelism. Increasingly, the influence 
of the “Dalai Lama clique” based in India and widely supported in the West was also 
blamed for stoking Tibetan separatism, and the possibility of Muslims in Central Asia 
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promoting the idea of an independent “East Turkestan” among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was also feared.34  
Jiang Zemin invited the leaders of the five religions to Zhongnanhai twice in 1991 
and 1992 to discuss these issues and stress the importance of the “adaptation of religion 
to socialism.” At a meeting of the United Front in November 1993, Jiang explained that 
the concept of “adaptation to socialism” meant that religious believers were free to keep 
their theism and their religious faith, but politically they should love the motherland and 
defend the socialist system and the leadership of the CCP.35 They were to change their 
teachings and institutions that were not compatible with socialism, and use the positive 
aspects of religious teachings, practices, and morality to serve socialism. For example, 
cultural relics could be used for cultural development and patriotic education. Religious 
teachings and concepts could be used for socialist development, such as the liberal 
“theological construction” advocated by Protestant Bishop Ding Guangxun (1915-),36 the 
Catholic notion of “love the Nation and love the Faith,” the Buddhist theory of 
“humanistic Buddhism” understood as using Buddhism to serve society, 37  and the 
Muslim idea that “patriotism is part of faith.” Religious teachings on morality could be 
used to improve the moral standards of the people, and international religious exchanges 
could contribute to building friendships and unifying the motherland (Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan). The government would help them adapt to socialism by identifying 
the useful elements of their religious tradition, encouraging them to eliminate their 
unhealthy habits and teachings, encouraging them to participate in economic 
development, and giving them the role of bridges between the Party-state and the 
masses.38  
By the early 2000s, the tenor of speeches on religion was becoming even more 
positive. On 31 January 2001, Li Ruihuan (then a member of the Standing Committee of 
                                                
34 Chen Jinlong, op. cit., pp. 248-9. 
35 Speech reprinted in Zhonggong zhongyang, op. cit., pp. 249-255.  
36 Philip L. Wickeri, Reconstructing Christianity in China: K.H. Ting and the Chinese Church., Maryknoll, NY, 
Orbis Books, 2007; Ying Fuk-tsang, “Jiang lunli daode de jidujiao – dangdai Zhongguo shenxue dui shehui 
zhuyi de tiaozheng yu shiying” (An ethical Christianity – The adaptation of contemporary Chinese 
theology to socialism), in Ying Fuk-tsang, Dangdai zhongguo zheng-jiao guanxi (Contemporary Chinese state-
church relations), Hong Kong, Alliance Bible Seminary, 1999, pp. 133-85; Xing Fuzeng, “Church-State 
Relations,” art. cit., pp. 34-37; Dunch, art. cit., pp. 171-175.  
37 Ji Zhe, art. cit., pp. 253-256.  
38 For a discussion of the theory of “adaptation to socialism” by the Central Party School’s leading 
theoretician on religion, see Gong Xuezeng, Shehui zhuyi yu zongjiao (Socialism and religion), Beijing, 
Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2003, pp. 251-323. For examples of the discourse on adaptation by 
representatives of different religions, see Zhengxie Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui bangongting, Cujin jianshe 
hexie shehui: zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi shehui xiang shiying yantaohui lunwenji (Promoting the construction of a 
harmonious society: Proceedings of the conference on religion and adaptation to socialist society), Beijing, 
Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2005.  
the Political Bureau of 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman of 
the 9th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
CPPCC) gave a speech that, for the first time, discussed religion in a manner that 
legitimised CCP religious policy from the standpoint of traditional Chinese culture: much 
of Chinese culture is related to religion, he said, noting that China is a culture of 
harmonious assimilation, which has always absorbed different cultures and religions: 
foreign religions were constantly absorbing nourishment from Chinese culture and 
becoming “sinified.” In that sense, he stated, the CCP’s policy of religious freedom was 
in tune with traditional Chinese culture.39 
At the end of the same year, at a meeting on religious work, Jiang Zemin recognised 
the dual nature of religion, including both its negative and positive sides. The list of 
positive aspects was longer than in his 1993 speech: religion now also provided 
philanthropy, ensured the emotional and psychological stability of the masses, and 
preserved social order and stability. He noted the deep historical roots of religion and its 
long-term existence and continued influence, and recognised that religion might continue 
to exist even after the disappearance of classes and states – admitting that the goal of 
religion’s disappearance was even more distant than the realisation of communism.40 
Following his speech, an editorial in the Peoples’ Daily on 13 December 2001 
acknowledged that the CCP had the duty to represent the “legitimate interests of the 
broad masses of religious believers,” who were recognised as “a positive force in the 
construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”41 In a speech on 18 December 
2007 at a high-level Party study meeting, Hu Jintao further reinforced the positive 
discourse on religion, stressing that the “basic line” of the CCP’s religious work was to 
enable religious people to “play an active role in economic and social development”; to 
help them resolve their material difficulties and unite them around the goal of building a 
“moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui); and to strengthen the construction of 
the religious clergy, so that they would be well-trained to have the political, academic, 
and moral foundations for releasing the positive effect of religion on society.42  
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The system of religious management: United Front, Religious Affairs 
Bureau, official associations 
It was through the discursive network on religion that the goals enumerated by Hu 
Jintao could be carried out. This network refers to the deeply imbricated system 
combining the Party, through the United Front; the state, through the Religious Affairs 
Bureau; the religious communities, through their official associations; and academia, 
through the Institute of World Religions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as 
well as other religious research institutes. The post-Mao religious institution began to 
take shape as early as 1978, when the policy of religious freedom was restored at the 11th 
Party Congress, and the state was given the mandate of “strengthening the management” 
of religion and of actively guiding the adaptation of religion to socialism – while 
emphasising that “feudal superstition” remained banned. 43  The United Front 
Department was restored in 1978, and proceeded to rehabilitate religious leaders (notably 
those who were famous and of high standing) who had been persecuted during the 
Cultural Revolution, and to take measures to return them to normal religious life.44 As in 
the 1950s, religious leaders were appointed to political positions: by the early 2000s, 
10,000 out of 300,000 registered clerics held positions in Peoples’ Congresses and in 
Peoples’ Political Consultative Conferences (PPCC) at various levels.45  
The Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB)46 was also re-established in 1979, and given the 
tasks of supervising the re-establishment and operations of the official religious 
associations, the registration and management of clergy, and the registration and 
management of places of religious worship. United Front departments and Religious 
Affairs Bureaus and commissions were established at each level of government: national, 
provincial, municipal, and district. The United Front, as a branch of the CCP, is 
responsible for dealing with religious leaders as individuals, while the RAB, as a 
government unit, is responsible for dealing with the religious associations as corporate 
entities. RAB offices were responsible for administrative oversight of the official 
associations of the five recognised religions. The national RAB had a first division 
overseeing Buddhism and Daoism, a second division for Protestantism and Catholicism, 
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and a third division for Islam. (A fourth division, for “policy research,” “popular faith,” 
and “new religions” was established in 2005, as discussed below).  
In practice, at lower levels of government, it is often the same official who is in 
charge of the United Front, of religious affairs, and of minority nationalities affairs. This 
is not a centralised system, however: while lower-level religious affairs and United Front 
officials are supposed to follow the directives and policies of the central government, 
they are appointed by the provincial and local government and Party committee, to 
which they remain accountable, and not to the central Religious Affairs Bureau and 
United Front. There are thus extreme variations in the application of religious policy at 
the local level. The same situation prevails in the official religious associations, which 
were established at the provincial and local levels throughout the 1980s and 1990s: the 
leaders of these associations are “elected” by the members after extensive consultations 
with local United Front and RAB representatives, in order to ensure that the person 
elected would have religious legitimacy among the followers, while at the same time 
being politically acceptable to the government—the common understanding being that, 
if either of these conditions was not met, the work of the association would encounter 
serious difficulties, since it would lose the support of either the government or of the 
religious community. Since local religious leaders owe their selection to their local 
community and local RAB and United Front officials, their primary loyalty is to these 
local bodies and not to the national-level official association. The RAB is responsible for 
managing the legal religious communities, while the Public Security Bureau (PSB) 
prosecutes religious activities deemed illegal. Since the RAB and PSB at a given level 
jurisdiction do not necessarily communicate with each other or have good relations, 
policy implementation is not always coherent.  
The national-level official religious associations were re-established in 1980: the 
China Buddhist Association, the China Daoist Association, the China Islamic 
Association, and the Protestant and Catholic associations. In the latter cases, in order to 
compensate for the lack of legitimacy of the Mao-era Chinese Catholic Patriotic 
Association (CCPA) and of the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the 
authorities established new Christian associations that could focus on internal theological, 
pastoral, and liturgical matters, while the Patriotic Associations continued to handle 
political relations with the government and CCP. These new bodies were, for the 
Catholics, the National Conference of Bishops (1980), which was led by clergy as 
opposed to the lay CCPA and the National Administrative Commission of the Catholic 
Church in China (1980), and, for the Protestants, the China Christian Council, which had 
an overlapping membership with the TSPM.47 The YMCA and YWCA were also re-
established in collaboration with the United Front, the Communist Youth League, and 
the All-China Womens’ Federation, to organise the youth activity of Christians and to 
build ties with Christian youth in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas.48 Following 
their establishment at the national level, provincial and local associations were created. 
For the Daoists, for instance, there were 83 local associations in the early 1990s, 133 by 
1999, and more than 200 by the early 2000s.49  
 
The management of religious clergy 
 
A key concern of the Religious Affairs authorities and of the official associations is the 
ordination, registration, and management of the five religions’ clergy. To be permitted to 
work as religious professionals, clerics need to be acknowledged by their local religious 
association, which then sends their file to the local RAB. In 1997 there were 200,000 
Buddhist monastics, including almost 80,000 Han Mahayana clerics (about one-third 
female), 120,000 Tibetan monks and nuns and 1,700 reincarnate lamas, and 10,000 
Theravada monks among the Dai and other minorities in Yunnan. (These figures can be 
compared to those from the early 1950s: 240,000 Han; 400,000 Tibetan and 8,000 
Theravada clerics.) The number of Daoist monastics was lower but growing, with 12,000 
in the early 1990s and double that number a decade later.50  
“Patriotic education” was implemented in all religious communities from 1994. Here, 
the main issue was integrating traditional forms of training and ordination with modern, 
standardised procedures being promoted by the state, as well as the question of political 
loyalty. For the ordination of monks, regulations were promulgated by the CBA and 
CTA. The first cohort of 47 Buddhist monastics were ordained in 1980; in 1987, 1,008 
monks were ordained at Jizushan in Yunnan; the rhythm of Buddhist ordinations 
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accelerated during the early twenty-first century so that about half the clergy was 
ordained. For Quanzhen Daoists, shoujie ordination ceremonies were reinstated at 
Baiyunguan in Beijing for a first cohort of 75, and in 1995, at Qingchengshan, for 400 
candidates; for them, the number of ordinations was tiny in relation to the total monastic 
population.  
The religious authorities are also concerned about the formal training of the clergy. 
Officials and scholars regularly lament the poor “quality” (suzhi) of clerics51 -- and stress 
the need for raising up a new generation of well-trained religious leaders. That this 
should be properly done, under government supervision, is also important so that future 
generations of clergy will be loyal to the CCP’s leadership and to the socialist system.52 In 
1991, the United Front and the central RAB issued a document detailing a policy to 
identify promising young clergy with good political attitudes and religious knowledge, to 
nurture them so that within five to ten years they could become the next generation of 
religious leaders.  
The chief instrument for this training is the official religious academies and 
seminaries. The year 1980 saw the re-establishment of the China Buddhist Academy, the 
China Islamic Academy, the Nanjing Theological Seminary, and the China Catholic 
Seminary. After 1982, local academies were also created: six Buddhist, five Islamic, five 
Protestant, and five Catholic. In their first decade of operation, these academies 
produced 2,000 graduates.53 Specialised Buddhist academies were set up for Han, Tibetan, 
and Pali (Theravada) Buddhism. The China Daoist Academy was finally established at 
Baiyunguan in 1990. By 1997, there was a total of 74 official religious training institutes. 
These academies and seminaries are organised in standard academic style, with courses of 
study lasting two to four years, followed by examinations and the conferring of a 
diploma equivalent to an associate or professional degree, as well as a religious title. After 
graduation, the graduates return to their religious units. The training, which includes 
political studies, Marxism, and foreign languages, differs from traditional modes of 
transmission, especially for the Daoists;54 it is often not seen as a true spiritual education 
but merely a ticket to advancement in their official careers, giving clerics the academic 
and social background needed to successfully function within the system of relationship 
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building and bureaucratic politics within which the religious associations are embedded. 
If the first leaders after the re-establishment of the religious associations in 1978-1980 
often won huge respect for having survived the Cultural Revolution and invested all their 
energy in reviving their institutions, the next generation lacked such aura.55 By the 2000s, 
a good number of clerics were complaining that the top levels of the clergy were 
controlled by clerics with diplomas (Ph.D. being preferred) who maintained good 
relationships with officials, spent a large part of their time in meetings and banquets, and 
were managers rather than religious persons, while spiritual training was disappearing. 
These bureaucratic leaders are in sharp contrast to charismatic types outside of or on the 
margins of official institutions, even though a few charismatic Buddhists and Daoists do 
get appointments in their associations.56 
 
Managing places of religious worship57 
 
Another of the tasks of the Religious Affairs authorities is to negotiate the “return” of 
religious sites to the official religious associations—especially famous monasteries, large 
churches, and temples in the cities and areas with high concentrations of believers, and in 
ethnic minority areas. Famous temples and churches of historic value are often restored 
at the government’s expense, often more to impress foreign visitors (including official 
delegations from Buddhist and Muslim countries) than to accommodate local believers. 
The return of temples has been a source of constant conflict, since most religious venues 
had been taken over by other units and departments during the Mao era, and the most 
important sites were often under the control of the tourism, cultural relics, or parks 
administrations, which were not willing to give them up. In 1983, a policy was enacted to 
open “key” national Buddhist and Daoist monasteries to the public as places of religious 
worship, and for them to be managed by monastics. This led to the paltry number of 142 
Buddhist and 21 Daoist temples being opened up. Progress was so slow that, again in 
1994, a new directive was issued by the United Front and the Religious Affairs Bureau to 
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rapidly resolve the many outstanding cases. By 1995, there were 77,981 officially 
registered places of religious worship: 44 percent were mosques, 40 percent were 
churches (34 percent Protestant and 6 percent Catholic), 15 percent were Buddhist 
monasteries, and 2 percent were Daoist temples.58 At the time of writing, over 30 years 
after the Cultural Revolution, negotiating the transfer of religious sites remains one of 
the major preoccupations of religious affairs officials and of the religious associations.  
Officially designated places of worship are, according to Document 19, “under the 
administrative control of the Bureau of Religious Affairs, but the religious organisations 
themselves and professional religious themselves are responsible for their 
management.”59 In the case of Buddhist and Daoist temples, they are managed by their 
local Buddhist or Daoist association (which often has its offices within the premises of 
the major temples), following principles of “democratic management” (by resident clerics 
and not lay temple committees), under the supervision of the local RAB. Regulations for 
the management of temples stipulate the administrative structure and provide for the 
protection of historical relics. Religious life is to be “normalised” zhengchanghua; “normal” 
religious life includes scripture recitation in temples, rituals, and self-cultivation; whereas 
sorcery, exorcism, divination, spirit possession, spirit-writing, and fengshui, as superstitions, 
are illegal. Since the latter activities are among the main traditional sources of revenue for 
temples, this forced them to seek alternative income streams, notably through tourism; 
however, market demand, and more relaxed controls by the late 1990s, means that 
“superstitious” activities have become increasingly prevalent and visible in temples. 
Meanwhile, negotiating their autonomous space and control over resources with the local 
RAB and local Buddhist/Daoist association takes much of the time of temple clerics.60  
Temples that are major tourist attractions enjoy high levels of revenue, leading to 
conflicts among religious associations and government agencies all claiming a share of 
the pie. In some jurisdictions, for example, provincial Daoist associations levy a fee of 5 
percent on the revenues of all temples under their management. In some areas, RABs 
have shown strong interest in profitable temples, and ignored others. In temples 
managed by clerics, corrupt relations of profit-sharing between temple abbots and local 
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authorities have been the topic of frequent controversy. Often, the authorities simply 
outsource the management of temples to private businesses, which invest in the 
construction and promotion, hire clerics to staff them, and revert a part of the profits to 
the government.61 The tourist and business potential of Buddhist sites has led to a trend 
of local authorities and entrepreneurs building open-air giant Buddhas in order to attract 
tourists and pilgrims—a phenomenon that has been decried by religious affairs officials.  
 
Non-“religious” orthodoxies and heterodoxies 
 
The institutional framework for religious affairs described above is based on a narrow 
definition of religion that excludes much of China’s religious culture. The very 
narrowness of the category of “religion,” restricted to official associations of the five 
recognised religions, and the political sensitivity and restrictions attached to the category, 
have led to a rush on the part of other actors, both within and outside the state, to 
designate a wide range of practices under non-religious labels, and thus to secure the 
legitimacy and legality of the practices – creating what Fenggang Yang has called the 
“grey market” of religion. 62  In so doing, however, they are subject to the norms 
associated with that non-religious category, which were defined and debated within the 
discursive network surrounding that category.  
A notable case was the body cultivation traditions, which had been institutionalised 
under the category of “qigong” in the 1950s, where they were integrated into the 
discursive network of medicine, rather than religion. The post-Mao era saw qigong spread 
from Chinese medicine into the discursive networks of sports, national defence, and 
science, where, far from the restrictions and sensitivities of the “religion” label, many 
forms of religiosity were able to find expression under a cloak of legitimacy. For over a 
decade, from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s, while officially designated “religious” 
communities were banned from holding activities or publicly promoting their teachings 
outside the premises of designated places of worship, thousands of popular qigong groups 
could freely and publicly promote meditation, breathing, and gymnastic regimens that 
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were often explicitly based on Buddhist and Daoist symbols and cosmology, induced 
trance states, and sometimes even involved deity worship.63  
At the same time, by finding a home in the discursive regimes of medicine and 
science, qigong was required to submit to the normative standards and practices of those 
fields, transforming and secularising qigong in the process. When the opposite occurred, 
qigong became the target of a polemical campaign launched by some scientists and 
journalists labelling it as a “pseudo-science,” “superstition,” and as “evil cults,” xiejiao. 
The latter appeared in contemporary usage around 1995 in the wake of the Waco and 
Aum Shinrikyo incidents in the United States and Japan. By 1998 it was being used by 
Buddhists to condemn Falun Gong, and was adopted by the state to justify its 
suppression of Falun Gong beginning in July 1999. This led to the formation of a new 
discursive and institutional network, that of “evil cults,” made up of the Ministry of 
Public Security and its specialised anti-cult units, as well as state-sponsored anti-cult 
associations. In the anti-cult discourse, xiejiao was defined almost as an anti-religion, in 
sharp contrast to religion, which was depicted in unambiguously positive terms.64 There 
was little overlap between the “religion” and “evil cult” networks: the categories were 
defined as mutually exclusive, and recognised religious leaders, scholars, and officials 
who dealt with “religion” did everything they could to keep the two categories 
impermeable in order to protect the legitimacy of their own work and avoid being 
contaminated by the highly sensitive question of “evil cults.”  
Religiosity also invested the discursive networks of tourism, Confucianism, and 
national studies,65 as well as culture66 and intangible cultural heritage. The latter became 
an official category in 2004, after the Chinese government signed UNESCO’s 
Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage – which could include 
performing arts, craftsmanship, rituals, festivals, and folk customs. The Ministry of 
Culture is responsible for intangible heritage, and the nationwide network of cultural 
affairs bureaux, down to the provincial and county levels, has been mobilised to identify 
items of traditional culture to be officially designated as “intangible heritage” and benefit 
from special heritage protection and funding. Through this process, local ritual traditions 
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and cults to popular deities such as Mazu and Jigong – none of which are recognised as 
“religion” – have found a new “canonisation,” while inscribing them into the discursive 
and institutional norms of cultural heritage protection.  
 
Opening the category of religion 
 
Official policy has timidly begun to acknowledge the existence and even the legitimacy of 
this expanding realm of religious life. Chinese scholars of religion, sociology, and 
anthropology, through their studies of popular religion and new religious movements, 
and through their adoption of broader definitions of religion, have contributed to 
legitimising vast realms of activity previously stigmatised or excluded from the category 
of religion.67 The increasing intensity of relationships with the outside world has also led 
to a realisation that the religious dimension of such exchanges requires coming to terms 
with the religious diversity of China’s international partners. In 2005, a new set of 
regulations (zongjiao shiwu tiaoli) was promulgated, which was largely a consolidation of 
previous regulations and policies.68 A notable change in these regulations was that the 
procedure for the registration of religious associations made no mention of the five 
official religions, making it theoretically possible for other religions to register (but no 
other religion had succeeded in doing so at the time of writing). Indeed, taking stock of 
the reality that the religious world extends far beyond the five officially registered 
religions, in the same year the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA, the 
former national RAB renamed in 1998) established a fourth division to look into other 
groups, especially those pertaining to “popular faith” minjian xinyang and “new religions” 
xinxing zongjiao, as well as to conduct research on religious policy.  
At the time of writing, there was no explicit policy on popular faith and new religions, 
but there was a recognition that the phenomenon existed and should not be simply 
banned, and a willingness to build direct or indirect relationships with those communities, 
significantly contributing to removing any stigma associated with them – as long as they 
are not classified as “evil cults” or as challenging the CCP’s authority or the territorial 
integrity of the PRC. If the category of “popular faith” (minjian xinyang) has emerged in 
official research documents as a realm of legitimate religious practices, it had not, at the 
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time of writing, been built into a recognised administrative category. Different provinces 
and localities have taken different approaches, which are being monitored by SARA, and 
have been summarised into three models: (1) no government interference; (2) registering 
communal temples as Daoist (minjian xinyang daojiaohua); or (3) officially registering them 
as a new category of “popular faith.” A conference was held by SARA in 2008 to study 
the three options, but none was chosen, leaving the provinces to continue experimenting. 
At the same time, there were increasingly explicit indications that communal temples 
were (along with Buddhism and Daoism) seen as an important resource for slowing the 
growth of Christianity in the countryside.69 Other local variations have been observed, 
such as communal temples registering as Buddhist, and, exceptionally, temples of the 
Three-in-One Teachings (sanyi jiao) have registered under that label in some parts of 
Fujian.70  
Friendly exchanges of delegations have taken place between the fourth division of 
SARA and the Confucian Academy of Hong Kong, which is ardently lobbying for 
establishing Confucianism as the national religion of China, 71  as well as with the 
Yiguandao redemptive society in Taiwan (still officially banned on the mainland as a 
huidaomen, “reactionary sect and secret society”). The Eastern Orthodox Church, which 
has believers among the Russian ethnic minority and some Chinese in the far Northeast 
and far Northwest, as well as historic properties in Beijing and Shanghai, has been 
registered for many years at the provincial level in Heilongjiang Province and, after long 
negotiations, Orthodox religious services were authorised (in the premises of the Russian 
consulate) in Shanghai in the spring of 2008. Foreign Jews living in China – who had a 
significant historical presence in Shanghai and Harbin during the early twentieth century 
-- are allowed to associate and worship, but SARA refuses to recognise the claims of 
religious identity by descendants of the Kaifeng Jews, who had settled in China during 
the Song dynasty.72  
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For “new religions,” the main cases being dealt with by SARA are the Bahá’í Faith73 
and the Mormons.74 Both profess strict obedience to the law as part of their religious 
teachings and scrupulously avoid establishing religious institutions in the mainland, 
earning the trust of the authorities while, through natural friendships and overseas travel, 
the number of Chinese believers grow. Expatriates from the two religions are allowed to 
establish associations (limited to foreigners) in major cities, while the authorities generally 
do not interfere with small-scale, informal gatherings of Chinese believers held in private 
homes.75 While the Mormons regularly invite Chinese officials and scholars to Brigham 
Young University in Utah, which has a strong expertise in religion and law, SARA and 
the Bahá’í Assemblies of Macau and Hong Kong have held regular exchanges of 
delegations and joint conferences on building harmony and social development, which 
are important areas of Bahá’í teachings and engagement.76  
SARA’s contacts with these various groups, however, take place in the context of 
official exchanges with Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, or overseas, or with foreigners 
living in China, and do not necessarily concern policy toward these religions in the 
mainland. Some of the cases have been handled by SARA in the context of managing 
China’s relations with Russia (which has aggressively pursued the rights of China’s 
Orthodox Christians), Israel (which, at the diplomatic level, has ignored the Kaifeng 
Jews),77 and the US (which has pressed for the rights of Mormons under presidents Bush 
and Obama, who appointed a Mormon as US ambassador to China).78  
 
Conclusion 
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The official Chinese discourse on religion is now explicitly positive about religion and 
increasingly friendly towards religious communities that until recently were actively 
banned, stigmatised, or ignored. To be sure, this represents a greater degree of openness 
towards religion in general and towards a greater plurality of forms of religious 
expression – as long as they do not challenge the authority of the CCP or the territorial 
integrity of the PRC. But this opening up remains timid, and its outcome remains to be 
seen. Such an “opening” should not be understood as leading to an inexorable 
American-style deregulation of the religious sphere. Since 1979, China’s religious policy 
has consistently sought to further institutionalise religion under the guidance of the CCP. 
The recent speeches by Hu Jintao and CCP policy documents, with their positive 
discourse on religion, have not called for the state stepping out of the religious realm, but 
for it to strengthen and expand the official religious institutions and their personnel. The 
hesitation of the authorities, in their growing recognition of the religious life going on 
outside those institutions, is not about how much to let it be free – but about how to 
effectively institutionalise and manage such a huge domain of social and cultural life.  
 
Glossary  
Falun Gong 法論功 
fandong huidaomen  反動會道門 
fei wuzhi wenhua yichan  非物質文化遺產 
fengshui  風水 
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛  
huizhang  會長 
Jiang Zemin 江澤民 
Jizushan 雞足山 
Li Ruihuan  李瑞環 
mixin  迷信 
minjian xinyang  民間信仰 
minjian xinyang daojiaohua  民間信仰道教化 
minsu   民俗 
minzu fengqing  民族風情 
qigong  氣功 
sanyi jiao 三一教 
shenhan wupo   神漢巫婆 
shoujie  受戒 
xiaokang shehui 小康社會 
xiejiao   邪教 
xin daojia  新道家 
xinxing zongjiao  新興宗教 
Tiandijiao   天帝教 
wenhua  文化 
wenwu  文物 
Yiguandao 一貫道 
zhengchanghua 正常化 
Zhongnanhai 中南海 
zongjiao  宗教 
zongjiao shiwu tiaoli 宗教事務條例 
 
 
